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Product demand, supply and internal coordination are all explicitly specified in a model 
to study how they jointly determine the division of labor (job span).  A larger job span 
means fewer workers are used to cover a production process, which is helpful in 
coordination and product quality, but not in lowering training cost.  Although coordination 
is at the core, the model shows that, in general, job span is affected by all demand and 
supply factors.  With marginal labor productivity declining, job span is narrower when 
the market is larger, as Adam Smith believed.  It is narrower when coordination 
technology is better or wage is lower.  It is likely narrower when unit training cost or 
productivity is higher.  The results are reversed if labor has increasing marginal 
productivity.  These results are either new or shed new light on previous theories of 
specialization.  They have plausible empirical implications.  They show the importance of 
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In this paper, we study a very old question in economics with a new theoretic 
model.  The multi-century old question is what determines the division of labor.  The 
model we use to study the question is new in that it explicitly specifies product demand, 
supply and internal coordination to see how they simultaneously determine the division 
of labor, rather than looking at one of these factors at a time as previous studies did.   
The model contributes significantly to the literature in at least three ways.  First, it 
fills a gap in the literature due to the lag of theories behind empirical findings.  Second, it 
sheds new light on some of the best-known previous claims on the division of labor, e.g., 
those made by Adam Smith (1776) and Becker and Murphy (1992).  We can thus either 
further qualify or generalize these claims, or both.  Last, but not least, the model has new, 
interesting and plausible empirical implications that previous theories have not had.  
Since the early 1990s, a large and rich body of empirical literature of human 
resource practices including job design has emerged and provided convincing evidence of 
a close relationship between the external market and job design.  Baily (1993), Berg et al 
(1994), and Dunlop and Weil (1996) reported that, in the US apparel industry, adoption 
of group-based job design with more tasks for individual workers in modular assembly 
systems is more likely in the production of fashion wears where delivery time and quality 
pressures are high, while the traditional, individual-based and narrow job design remains 
dominant in the production of apparels for mass consumption.  A similar experience is 
reported by Geary (1999) in apparel manufacturing in Scotland.  Geber (1992) reported 
that teamwork at Saturn was intended to solve General Motor’s problem of poor product 
 1quality and declining market share due to it.
1  Osterman (1994) finds systematic evidence 
“strongly confirming” that a market with emphases on “service, quality, and variety of 
products rather than low cost” are among the most important variables determining who 
would adopt innovative human resource practices which typically have broadly defined 
jobs as a core element.  Along with many others, these findings make evident two things.  
On the one hand, the external market plays a critical role in determining job design.  At 
the same time, job design affects the demand for a product because it has implications for 
product quality, variety and delivery time.
2   
The close and interactive relationship between the external market and job design 
has not been carefully studied by theorists as they have focused on one factor at a time.  
Recognizing the great importance of the division of labor to productivity, Adam Smith 
(1776) asked the question of what determines the division of labor.  He conjectures it is 
the size of the market.  Becker and Murphy (1992) disagree and argue that the division of 
labor is mainly limited by the cost of coordination.  They show that, only in the trivial 
case where the marginal benefit is always greater than the marginal cost of specialization 
does the size of the market matter.  Also focusing on coordination, Bolton and 
Dewatripont (1994) modeled the efficiency gain resulting from specialized information 
processing and the increased cost of communication with more specialization.  A most 
recent and significant contribution along this line is made by Dessein and Santos (2003), 
                                                           
1 Also see Lazear (1998, p.515) on Saturn’s experience. 
2 Sociologists who study organizations are keen to the interdependence between an organization 
and its environment.  See Bedeian and Zammuto (1991, Ch. 8) for a presentation of different 
theories on this.  Our integrated model has elements of contingency theory and strategic choice 
theory from sociology, with the firm responding to its external market and also trying to influence 
the market through job design.   
 2who derived the demand for coordination when workers can be coordinated either by ex 
ante rules or through ex post communication. 
The gist of our integrated model can be summarized as follows.  As in Bolton and 
Dewatripont (1994) and others, the model assumes that coordination is more difficult 
when jobs are more specialized, resulting in lower expected product quality and thereby 
reduced demand for the product.  The desire to improve product quality motivates the 
firm to increase job span.
3  However, to be able to perform a job of broader span, a 
worker needs more training.  Saving on training cost motivates the firm to reduce job 
span.  Equilibrium job span is found when the marginal benefit of it, seen in better 
product quality, is equal to the marginal cost of it, seen in higher training cost.  When a 
demand or supply condition changes, the relative significance of one these margins to the 
other is affected, leading to a new equilibrium job span.   
The model finds that, with marginal productivity of labor declining, jobs do 
become more specialized when the market becomes larger, as Smith (1776) believed.  
The reason for this is that, when production is at a larger scale and involves more workers, 
a marginal increase in per worker training results in a larger marginal increase in total 
training cost, meaning that the firm can reduce job span for a more significant saving of 
total training cost.  In light of this logic, we can make a more general statement: Any 
change in demand or supply leading to a larger equilibrium output is a reason for 
increased division of labor.  Adam Smith’s (1776) claim of the division of labor 
depending on market size is a special case of this general statement.  However, the result 
                                                           
3 We discuss later in the paper the effect of product delivery time or variety rather than quality on 
job design.  By job design, we mean how broad or narrow the job span is in a firm.  A narrower 
job span means a greater degree of the division of labor with fewer tasks bundled into the job and 
assigned for a worker to perform.  We use these terms interchangeably in this paper.  
 3is reversed when marginal productivity of labor is increasing.  Market size does not affect 
job span when marginal productivity of labor is constant.  Constant marginal productivity 
of labor is exactly what Becker and Murphy (1992) assumed, implicitly, in their model.  
It is thus not surprising that they find specialization generally having nothing to do with 
the size of the market.  We will explain these results after they are formally derived.   
On the supply side, the model finds that a higher (market-determined) wage leads 
to a larger job span.  The reason is that higher labor cost leads to a lower output level.  
This changes the cost and benefit of specialization in favor of a larger job span as 
explained in the preceding paragraph.  This result has the empirical implication that 
expensive labor should not be hired to produce low quality product, which seems quite 
plausible and offers another explanation for why quality is usually better when a product 
is produced in a developed rather than a developing country.  The model also finds that 
higher unit training cost reduces job span so long as unit training cost is small relative to 
the size of the market.  Similarly, lower labor productivity is likely to lead to a larger job 
span.  Better coordination technology always leads to a smaller job span, as in Becker 
and Murphy (1992) and Bolton and Dewatripont (1994).
4  
Both conceptually and technically, this paper is most closely related to the 
literature studying coordination problems in organizations, especially those in the 
literature studying horizontal specialization.  As further explained later in the paper, this 
paper also contributes to human capital theory and the comparative study of organizations.  
It abstracts from incentive problems in organizations.   
                                                           
4 This result is not in Dessein and Santos (2003).  In their model, improved coordination 
technology may lead the firm to increase worker discretion at work.  Consequently, demand for 
ex post coordination may increase, leading to a larger job span.  
 4The paper is organized as follows.  The model is introduced in section 2.  The 
equilibrium job span is derived in section 3.  Comparative statics of job span with respect 
to all the factors of demand, supply and internal coordination are studied in sections 4 
through 6.  Section 7 discusses the model.  Section 8 reviews the literature and this 
paper’s relation to it.  Section 9 ends the paper with some additional comments.   
 
2. The Model: 
  Our model has the following specifications  
Production and Job Span 
A production line (process) has unit length in the interval of [0, 1] and uses labor 
as the only input.  Let N be the technologically determined maximum number of workers 
that the firm can assign to a line, N being a very large positive number.  Beyond N, the 
line becomes too crowded and experiences a dramatic loss of productivity.  The firm 
assigns n workers, 0 < n < N, to cover the entire line.  This way, the firm divides the line 
into n jobs.  Wage is w per worker and determined exogenously by the supply and 
demand in the labor market.  
Assuming symmetry among all workers and all jobs, the span of a job is b = 1/n.  
Job 1 has the responsibility for the part of the process in the range of (0, b1], job 2 has the 
responsibility for the part of the process in the range of (b1, b2], and so on.  In general, bi 
denotes job i with the responsibility for the segment of the production line in the range of 
(ib-b, ib], i∈[1, n].  A larger value of b represents a larger job span, which means that 
more tasks are grouped in the job.  We will ignore the fact that the number of tasks is 
usually discrete whereas b is a continuous variable, and use the terms “more tasks” and “a 
 5larger job span” loosely and interchangeably.  The integer issue is discussed in section 7 
of the paper. 
A worker has a total amount of time t=1.  When b is larger, the worker has a 
broader range of tasks to perform and each task receives less time.  Per task output is thus 
reduced, as in Becker and Murphy (1992), and so is per line output.  This implies a 
positive relationship of the output of a production line qline to the number of workers 
assigned to the line.  For simplicity, assume that this relationship is linear in the form of 
qline = n = 1/b.  
The simplifying assumption does not lead to a loss of generality.  Its essence is that per 
line output is proportional to the number of workers assigned to the line.   
Note the feature of constant marginal productivity of labor in the production of 
qline in the range of n∈[0, N].  The assumption is largely for convenience, since in our 
model there is a gain to specialization reflected in lower per worker training cost as we 
will specify shortly.  Qualitatively, the results we obtain are not affected when marginal 
productivity changes are not too dramatically.
5  
A parallel line can be established to increase output.  The firm hires L workers to 
set up a total of L/n parallel lines.  bi on different lines can be seen as different positions 
in a job of the same title.  A firm with a job span of breath bi has a total of n = 1/bi jobs 
and L/n positions for each job.   
                                                           
5 Non-dramatic changes in marginal productivity of labor serve to make the issue of job design 
nontrivial.  If marginal productivity decreases or increases rapidly, this factor alone would 
determine job design.  In reality, it is quite possible that, in many situations and for the reasons 
identified by Adam Smith (1776), the number of workers assigned to a production line would 
initially lead to significant gains.  When this is true, the firm would assign more workers to the 
line.  But, beyond a certain point (say N as we have assumed), productivity will decline rapidly.  
The number of workers assigned to the line should never be beyond this point.  In between these 
 6With per line output being qline= n, and the number of lines L/n, it follows that 
total output from all the lines is qall lines= n(L/n) = L.   
qall lines is used as an input in combination with all other inputs (or, for simplicity, 
the other input K) to produce the final output q.  Assume that the production of the final 
product has a Cobb-Douglas functional form with all the conventional features, we have 
  q = aK
α(qall lines)
β     (1) 
where a > 0 is the coefficient,  0 < β < 1.  We assume that K is fixed and let θ’=aK
α.  This 
assumption makes K an exogenous factor in the model.  This is reasonable if K is a factor 
the firm cannot change, either in the short run or even in the long run.  Examples of such 
a factor include physical capital, managerial or distribution capacity, limited supply of a 
certain input.  Later in the paper, we will study how an exogenous change in θ’, which 
could be due to a change in a, K or α individually or jointly, affects job design.   
It is very important not to confuse constant marginal productivity of labor in the 
production of qper line with declining marginal productivity of labor in the production of q 
reflected in β < 1.  The former is about how workers are assigned to jobs, when the total 
number of workers is given.  The Latter is how output changes when total employment 
changes.  It could be caused by more aggravated monitoring and incentive problems as 
the total number of workers increases, as in Qian (1994), even when job design remains 
optimal.  Another possible cause of it is a more aggregated problem of limited managerial 
attention as the total number of workers increases, as in Cremer (1980) and Geanakoplos 
and Milgrom (1991).  Again, the problem is a function of the size of the firm even when 
job design remains optimal.    
                                                                                                                                                                             
two extremes, there is likely a range in which productivity is relatively stable.  The equilibrium 
number of workers assigned to a line should always be in this range.  
 7Assume β = 0.5, and substitute L in for qall lines.  The production function becomes 
q = θ’L
½, which has the inverse form of 
L = θq
2,   where θ = 1/θ’.        (2) 
Assuming β = 0.5 is largely for convenience.  As we will explain later, it does not 
qualitatively affect the results of the model, so long as β < 1.  A larger θ means less of the 
other input used in production, or the other factor has become less productive, making L 
(or, more precisely, the intermediate product qall lines) less productive in the production of 
the final output q. 
Training 
Without training, a worker has zero productivity.  The amount of training needed 
to perform a job, h, is proportional to the job span b, i.e., h = λb, where λ > 0 is a constant.  
Without any loss of generality, assume λ = 1, leading to h = b, i.e., the amount of 
training needed is equal to the span of the job that the worker is assigned to perform.  
Training has unit cost c.  The total cost of training a worker to perform a job is 
thus ch = cb = c/n.   
Since there are n workers in a production line, total training cost to establish a 
complete production line of unit length is n(c/n) = c, which captures the cost of a larger 
job span.  When job span is larger, more parallel lines need to be established to produce a 
given amount of output, leading to a larger total training cost.
6
Coordination and product quality 
This part of our model is a modified version of Dessein and Santos (2003).  Like 
them, we assume that the local work environment of a worker is uncertain.  The random 
                                                           
6 Berg, et al (1994) see higher training cost as one of the main barriers to the adoption of team-
oriented modular assembly system in the US apparel industry.   
 8variable in the local environment of a job is independently distributed across jobs and its 
realized value ηi observed only by worker i.   
In Dessein and Santos (2003), product quality is determined by two sets of worker 
actions.  First, it is determined by how well a worker’s action aii matches with the local 
condition ηi.  (aii - ηi)
2, i∈n is the measure of the effectiveness of the match.  Second, 
quality is also determined by how workers’ actions are matched with each other.  Let aij 
be i’s action to match with ajj.  (aij – ajj)
2, i, j∈n, j ≠ i, is the measure of effectiveness of 
this match.  The larger the value of (aij – ajj)
2 , the worse is the match. 
 Similarly, (aji – 
aii)
2 is the measure of the effectiveness of j’s action to match with aii.  Having these two 
separate sets of actions by every worker is critical in their model in order to derive 
endogenous demand for ex post coordination.   
To focus on the problem of cross-worker coordination, we assume that matching 
the action with the local condition is not a problem for a worker.  Ex post coordination is 
always needed and the only challenge.  We therefore ignore the first set of actions and 
focus only on the second set of actions.  It is very important that we bear in mind that ajj 
= ηj is a value first known to j only and it needs to be communicated to i for (aij – ajj)
2 to 
be small.  And this is true between any two workers.  Under this assumption, aggregate 
ineffectiveness in the system is measured by
7
                                                           
7 We have assumed person-to-person (or job-to-job), rather than task-to-task, communication as 
in Dessein and Satos (1993).  In the spirit of their discussion, person-to-person assumption is 
appropriate when worker i can sufficiently summarize her situation and action taken, and worker j 
knows what appropriate actions should be for all his tasks so long as he understood the nutshell of 
worker i’s situation and action.  A common example is worker i informs j when to expect his 
work to be done, as a pilot would do to inform his crew and ground people about the plane’s 
arrival time or an assembly worker informs others of a delay.  In Vayanos (2003), a financial 
analyst provides summarized information to his supervisor, with some loss involved.  Person-to-
person communication is assumed by Ichniowski and Shaw (2004) and in Garicano (2000) who 
 9  Q   =   ∑ i ∑ j ≠ i (aij – ajj)
2     
Assume further that, at probability r∈(0, 1), two workers can understand each 
other correctly and coordinate properly between them.  In such an event, (aij – ajj)
2 = 0.  
At probability (1 – r), they fail to understand each other and coordinate properly between 
them.  This results in (aij – ajj)
2 = ∆aij, 0 < ∆aij < ∞.  We assume that this probability 
distribution is not affected by whether the communication is through a supervisor or 
directly between the workers, i.e., miscommunication is equally likely if it is made 
through a supervisor as it is directly between two workers.
8  Under this assumption, Q 
has the expected value of  
E(Q) = ∑ i ∑ j ≠ i (1-r)∆aij     (3) 
   =  n(n-1)(1-r)∆aij
   =  [(1-b)/b
2](1-r)∆aij
The second equal sign is based on the assumption of symmetry across jobs.
9   
It is easy to verify that [∂E(Q)/∂b] < 0, meaning that a larger job span leads to less 
aggregate coordination loss across workers.  The idea behind this negative relationship 
between E(Q) and b is quite intuitive. Since a quality problem is due to misunderstanding 
between two workers, by reducing the number of workers involved in the production line, 
the firm can reduce the expected numbers of misunderstandings and quality problems.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
modeled workers looking for help from, respectively, fellow workers or supervisors to deal with 
randomly arriving problems.   
8 Involving a supervisor would lead us into a discussion of vertical specialization and that of 
supervisor’s span of control.  See Garicano (2000) for such a discussion.  
9 Note that Q can have two extreme values.  One is Q = Qm= 0, suggesting the highest quality due 
to no miscommunication at all between any two workers.  This occurs at probability r
n(n-1) if n > 1, 
and is guaranteed if n = 1.  The other extreme value of Q is obtained when n = N, and all N 
workers misunderstand each other in every pair-wise communication.  This happens at 
probability (1 – r)
N(N-1).  In such a case, Q = QM = [(N – 1)N]∆aij .
 10Since in the rest of this paper we will only be dealing with E(Q), for notational economy 
and without any risk of confusion, from here on, we use Q to denote E(Q).   
Define ∆ = (1-r)∆aij.  The expected aggregate ineffectiveness measure Q can be 
rewritten as  
Q = ∆(1-b)/b
2      ( 4 )  
We can reinterpret Q as a measure of quality of the product, with a larger (smaller) 
Q indicating poorer (better) quality.
10  Such a reinterpretation is natural.  When the parts 
of a product have greater aggregate mismatch among them (seen in a larger Q), the total 
is less effective in serving the purpose.  Under this interpretation, quality is the best at 
Q=Qm=0.  It declines as Q increases, and is worst at Q=QM.  
From Q = ∆(1-b)/b
2, we can derive ∂Q/∂b = ∆(b-2)/b
3 < 0 and ∂
2Q/∂b
2 = ∆(6 - 
2b)/b
4 > 0.  The negative relationship between Q and b is illustrated in Figure 1.   
  Figure 1: The relationship between Q and b 
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Product demand 
  We assume a linear demand function with  
                                                           
10 Dessein and Satos (1993) reinterpreted Q after the cost of communication as the firm’s profit, 
with a smaller Q indicating a larger profit.   
 11  p   =   ψ(Q, I) – ωq 
where p is price, I > 0 consumer income, ψ a function of Q and I, ω > 0 a constant, and q 
the quantity of the product sold.   
Since a larger Q represents poorer quality, consumer demand for the product has a 
negative relationship with Q.  Specifically, assume   
ψ = ψm > 0,   When Q = QM 
  ψ = ψM > ψm  When Q = Qm = 0 
∂ψ/∂Q exists for all Q∈(0, QM), with (∂ψ/∂Q)<0, and (∂
2ψ/∂Q
2) < 0, for all Q∈(Qm, QM); 
(∂ψ/∂Q) = 0 when Q = Qm, and (∂ψ/∂Q) = - ∞ when Q = QM.  These assumptions say that, 
for any given income, demand is at its lowest when quality is at its worst possible.  The 
impact of better quality on demand is always positive.  The impact is very strong when 
quality is extremely low, but declines and is zero when quality is at the highest level 
possible.  Together, these assumptions guarantee an interior equilibrium level of quality, 
hence an interior solution for job design which determines quality. 
We also assume that ∂ψ/∂I > 0, and ∂
2ψ/∂Q∂I < 0, for all Q∈(0, QM).  ∂ψ/∂I > 0 
means that demand is larger at any price when income is higher.  ∂
2ψ/∂Q∂I < 0 means 
that consumers become more quality sensitive when their income increases.  In other 
words, at a higher income level, demand increases faster as quality improves.  ∂
2ψ/∂Q∂I 
= 0 means that consumer sensitivity to quality remains the same at different income 
levels.  The two situations are illustrated in, respectively, Figure 2a and Figure 2b below.  
In the figures, I1 and I0 are two income levels with I1 > I0.   
 
 12Figure 2a: Case of ∂
2ψ/∂Q∂I<0   Figure 2b: Case of ∂
2ψ/∂Q∂I=0 
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Firm’s objective 
The firm’s objective is to maximize profit, given by the difference between total 
revenue and total cost.  Its total revenue is pq.  Its total wage cost is wL, where w is wage 
and L total employment. Its total training cost is c(L/n) = cbL, where c is per line training 
cost and L/n the number of lines.  Substituting these, the demand and the production 
functions into the firm’s profit function, the firm’s profit can be written as a function of 
two endogenous variables q and b as below.  
      Maximize E(π) = E(pq) – wL – c(L/n)      (5) 
        q, b 





        s.t.   1. All the constraints on the parameter values.   
2. The technologies determining quality measure Q, output level q, 
and job span b.   
 13In this optimization problem, the decisions variables are job span b (or the number 
of workers per production line), and total output level q (or the total number of workers 
hired L).  The parameters are  
I = income, which affects demand.
ω = slope of demand curve.  
c = unit cost of training. 
θ = a measure of productivity 
  r = probability of reliable and effective communication. 
∆aij = significance of uncoordinated actions due to miscommunication affecting Q. 
The main tradeoff in the model is between training cost and effectiveness of coordination.  
A larger job span reduces aggregate communication error (in probability terms), which 
improves expected product quality and thereby increases the demand for the product.  But 
it necessitates more training for every worker, leading to a higher total cost of training. 
 
3. Equilibrium.  
The firm’s maximization problem has first-order conditions with respects to b and 
q as below.  
∂E(π)/∂b = (∂Eψ/∂Q)(∂Q/∂b) – cθq = 0    FOC-b 
       ∂E(π)/∂q = E[ψ(Q, I)] – 2ωq – 2wθq – 2cbθq = 0  FOC-q 
The assumptions about ∂Eψ/∂Q guarantee that, when b is very small, Q is very 
large, and so is (∂Eψ/∂Q).  Thus the first term in FOC-b dominates, so that the whole 
expression is positive.  When b is very large, the first term becomes very small so that the 
second term dominates and the whole expression is negative.  Hence there exists a value 
 14of b at which FOC-b is satisfied.  It is also obvious there exits a value of q at which FOC-
q is satisfied.  As shown below, the second-order conditions are also satisfied, suggesting 





2)  < 0  
              ( - )      ( + )    ( - )        ( + )  
∂2E(π)/∂q
2 = – 2(ω + wθ + cbθ) < 0 
Rearranging FOC-q yields 
  q
* = Eψ(Q, I)/2(ω + wθ + cbθ)  
Substitute q
* into FOC-b and rearrange the equation.  The profit maximizing job span b
* 
is found when it satisfies the condition  
  ( ∂Eψ/∂Q)(∂Q/∂b) – cθ[Eψ(Q, I)]/2(ω + wθ + cbθ) = 0, or 
 
  2 ( ∂Eψ/∂Q)(∂Q/∂b)(ω + wθ + cbθ) – cθ[Eψ(Q, I)] = 0 ,  
 
in which b
* is given as an implicit function of all the parameters.   
For notational economy, from here on we will use ψQ in place of ∂Eψ/∂Q, Qb in 
place of ∂Q/∂b, and ψ in place of Eψ(Q, I).  The condition for the equilibrium b is 
rewritten as 
 2 ψQQb(ω + wθ + cbθ)  – cθψ = 0    (b
*) 
The first term in b
* is the marginal benefit of a larger span of job seen in a smaller quality 
problem (Qb) and, following it, an increased demand for the product (ψQ).  The second 
term is the marginal cost of a larger job span.   
 
4. Product demand and job span 
 15In the model, the demand curve is determined by two parameters, the slope of the 
curve measured by ω, and income level I.   
We first study how the slope of demand, measured by ω, affects b, i.e., we want to 
know the sign of ∂b/∂ω.   
From (b
*), we obtain 
 2 ψQQQb
2(ω + wθ + cbθ)(∂b/∂ω) + 2ψQQbb(ω + wθ + cbθ)(∂b/∂ω) 
 




= 0 . 
 
Or, A(∂b/∂ω) = - 2ψQQb < 0 , where 
  A   =   2 ψQQQb
2(ω + wθ + cbθ) + 2ψQQbb(ω + wθ + cbθ) + cθψQQb
So it is clear that ∂b/∂ω and its coefficient A have the opposite signs.   
Proposition 1: Job span and the slope of demand have a positive relationship, i.e., 
(∂b/∂ω)>0 
Proof: Note that, in A, only the third term is positive.  We prove that the third term is 
dominated by the second term so that A<0.  To see this, Substituting Qbb = ∆(6 - 2b)/b
4 
and Qb = ∆(b-2)/b
3 into the second and third terms in A, respectively, and define A’ in 
these two terms. 
  A ’   =   2 ψQ(ω + wθ + cbθ)∆(6 - 2b)/b
4 + cθψQ∆(b-2)/b
3
Drop ψQ in A’, and multiply A’ by b
4 to obtain  
A” = A’b
4/ψQ = 2(ω + wθ + cbθ)∆(6 - 2b) + cθ∆(b-2)b.   
 16A’<0 if A” > 0 because ψQ<0.  Recall the fact that 0 < b < 1.  Replace b in the first term 
of A” with 1, and b in the second term of A” with 0 to obtain the inequality 
  A”  >  2(ω + wθ + cbθ)∆4 - 2cθ∆b 
   =   8 ∆(ω + wθ) + 8∆cbθ - 2∆cbθ 
 
   =   8 ∆(ω + wθ) + 6∆cbθ > 0.       Q.E.D. 
 
The result of Proposition 1 is not very intuitive.  The reason for this result lies in 
the way in which the demand curve is specified.  Under our specification of a linear 
demand, the demand curve declines faster with a larger ω.  This means that, given ψ, 
demand is smaller at any price.  From the equation for q
*, we can see that a larger ω 
indeed leads to a smaller optimal output, holding job design constant.  From FOC-q, we 
can see that a smaller q means that the marginal total cost of training is smaller.  This 
gives the reason for increased job span and more training associated with it when ω is 
larger.  Hence we find a positive relationship between ω and b.   
Next, we study how changes in income affect job design.  When income increases, 
demand for the product goes up at any price and quality level.  Should the firm increase b 
to better assure quality or do the opposite?  The answer to this question depends on if the 
size effect or quality sensitivity effect of income dominates, as given by Proposition 2.  
By size effect, we mean how much demand increases with income, at any price and 
product quality.  By quality sensitivity effect, we mean how much more the consumer is 
willing to pay for better quality when income is higher.   
Proposition 2: 
1) When market size effect of income dominates, a higher income leads to smaller job 
span, i.e., ∂b/∂I < 0.   
 172) When quality sensitivity effect of income dominates, higher income leads to a larger 
job span, i.e. ∂b/∂I > 0.  
Proof: Again, from b
*, we can obtain   
 2 ψQQQb
2(ω + wθ + cbθ)(∂b/∂I) + 2ψQIQb(ω + wθ + cbθ) 
 




which after rearranging is A(∂b/∂I) = B, where  
 
A = 2ψQQQb
2(ω + wθ + cbθ) + 2ψQQbb(ω + wθ + cbθ) + 2ψQQbcθ 
 
B = cθψI - 2ψQIQb(ω + wθ + cbθ), 
 
A < 0 as explained in the proof of Proposition 1.  This means that the sign of ∂b/∂I is the 
opposite of the sign of B.  In B, there are two terms with opposite signs.  ψI in the first 
term measures the effect of income on demand, i.e., how much demand is increased when 
income is higher.  Call it the market size effect of income.  ψQI in the second term 
measures the effect of income on consumer sensitivity to product quality, i.e., how much 
consumer’s preference for quality changes as income increases.  Call this quality 
sensitivity effect of income.  It is clear from B that, when the market size effect 
dominates, B > 0 and (∂b/∂I) < 0.  When quality sensitivity effect dominates, B < 0 and 
(∂b/∂I) > 0.        Q.E.D. 
The intuition of Proposition 2 is not hard to understand.  Adam Smith (1937) 
believed that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.  Proposition 2.1 
confirms this result.  The mechanism leading to this result is explained by the equation 
for q
* and FOC-b.  In a larger market, equilibrium output level is higher.  In FOC-b, q is a 
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faster when output level is higher.  Holding the marginal gain from a larger job span and 
quality improvement constant, a larger output in a larger market leads to a reduced job 
span.  It is not surprising at all that the result is reversed if at a higher income level 
consumers are willing to pay much more for better quality.   
 
5. Labor costs and job span. 
In this model, there are two types of labor costs: wage and training cost.  We 
show that a higher wage unambiguously leads to a larger job span.  Surprisingly, the 
effect of a higher unit training cost c on job design is not as clear-cut as one might think.   
Proposition 3: Job span is larger when wage is higher, i.e., ∂b/∂w > 0.   
Proof:  From b*, we obtain 
  A ( ∂b/∂w) = - 2θψQQb < 0. 
where A = 2ψQQQb
2(ω + wθ + cbθ) + 2ψQQbb(ω + wθ + cbθ) + cθψQQb.  Since A < 0, as 
explained in the proof of Proposition 1, we have ∂b/∂w > 0.     Q.E.D.  
  Two facts are responsible for this result.  First, in FOC-b, we can see that w has 
no direct effect on the optimal job span b.  Second, in the equation for q
*, we can see 
wage adversely affects output level q, i.e., a larger w leads to a smaller q
*.   So w affects 
b only through its effect on q.  When output is reduced due to a higher wage, the marginal 
total cost of training is lower.  It is thus worthwhile to increase job span and, through it, 
improve product quality and increase the demand for the product. 
To see the empirical implication of Proposition 3, imagine a hypothetic situation 
of two plants identical in every respect, e.g. the technology, the amount of capital they 
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border and the other on the American side.  Proposition 3 predicts that, compared to their 
American counterparts, the workers in the Mexican plant will receive less extensive 
training, perform jobs of narrower task spans, and produce the same product at a higher 
output, but lower quality level, because wage is lower in Mexico.  Moving beyond this 
hypothetic situation, it seems a fairly common phenomenon in many markets that 
products from developing countries would take the lower end of the quality spectrum, 
whereas the same product produced in developed countries would take the higher end.  It 
is not hard to think of multiple explanations for this phenomenon.  One of them is that 
domestic consumers in developed countries have a stronger preference for quality.  This 
possibility is reflected in Proposition 2.2 above.  Proposition 3 provides another reason, 
which has the empirical implication that expensive labor should not be used to produce 
low quality products.  Instead, they should be more extensively trained to produce high 
quality product.
11   
Proposition 4:  Job span is reduced when unit training cost is higher, i.e., ∂b/∂c < 0, so 
long as unit training cost is sufficiently small relative to the size of the market measured 
by ψ.  The opposite is true if unit training cost is large relative to ψ.  
Proof: From b
*, we can obtain A(∂b/∂c) = θ(ψ - 2bψQQb), where 
A = 2ψQQQb
2(ω + wθ + cbθ) + 2ψQQbb(ω + wθ + cbθ) + cθψQQb < 0, 
                                                           
11 Still another possible explanation is better education and general skill level of workers in 
developed countries.  This explanation is a plausible for a given and limited period of time.  
However, in the longer run, one should probably think of the provision of education and 
acquisition of general skills as a response to the need for them.  Proposition 3 predicts that the 
demand for training is greater when wage is higher and workers are used to perform enriched jobs 
and produce high quality product.  Still another possible explanation is better management in 
developed countries.  This argument to a large extent boils down to better coordination and is 
reflected in Proposition 5 below.   
 20as shown in the proof of Proposition 1.  So the sign of ∂b/∂c is the opposite of the right-
hand side of the equation.  In the right-hand side, there are two terms.  ψ > 0 is from the 
demand function and measures the size of the market.  ψQQb > 0 in the second term 
measures the marginal effect of increased job span on demand.  When c is not too large, 
ψQQb is not too large either.  Given this, the first term will dominate if the size of the 
market measured by ψ is sufficiently large.  The right-hand side of the equation is 
positive, giving the results in the proposition.      Q.E.D. 
Several things can be said about this proposition.  First, intuitively, one would 
anticipate a higher unit training cost to unambiguously and straightforwardly lead to a 
narrower job span.  But the proposition says not so.  To understand the cause for the 
ambiguity, note that training cost has two effects on b
*.  The first and direct effect is 
reflected in FOC-b where the optimal b is determined holding output q as constant.  This 
effect says that b should always decrease when c is higher.  However, like wage cost w, 
high unit training cost c also adversely affects the optimal output level q, as clear from 
the equation for q
*.  When q from FOC-q is substituted into FOC-b, the indirect effect of 
c on b through its effect on q is reflected in the solution for b
*.  As in the case of higher 
wage, when higher unit training cost c leads to a lower output, the indirect effect of it is 
to increase job span.  Notice further that the effect of c on q is not constant.  It is easy to 
verify by taking the first and second derivatives of q
* with respect to c that q’(c)<0, 
q’(c)→0 as c→0, and q”(c)<0, i.e., the effect of c on output is trivial when c is very small, 
but accelerates when c becomes larger and larger.  Thus the indirect effect of c on b 
(through q) is limited when c is small and the direct effect of it dominates.  So, when c is 
small, b is large (so that ψQQb is also small) and a negative relationship between c and b 
 21is found.  But, when c becomes larger and larger, its negative effect on q accelerates and 
indirect effect on b also becomes stronger.  Then the indirect effect might dominate, 
resulting in a positive relationship of c with b.    
Technically, we can note that the combination of a small unit training cost c and a 
large market (relative to c) measured by ψ is not only reasonable, but also easily satisfied 
with certain parameter values, since c can always be arbitrarily close to zero.  To the 
contrary, a large c (leading to a small b and thus large ψQQb) relative to ψ could violate 
the non-negative profit condition for the firm.  So the combination of a large c and a 
small ψ can be an empty set.  However, we cannot be definitive about this without further 
specification of ψ.   
 
6. Coordination technology, labor productivity and job span. 
The model has three parameters measuring technological conditions.  Among 
them, r is a measure of communication technology i.e., how reliable communication is 
between two workers.  ∆aij is a measure of damage due to miscommunication and 
mismatched actions between workers i and j.  θ is a measure of productivity of the 
intermediate product qall lines produced by L.  In this section, we investigate how these 
technological factors affect job design.   
  We have defined ∆ = (1-r)∆aij.  ∆ can be seen as a measure of how effectively two 
workers can coordinate between their actions.  A larger ∆ suggests less effective 
coordination.  A line becomes less effective when communication is less reliable (i.e., 
when r is smaller), or miscommunication has a more severe consequence (i.e., when ∆aij 
 22is larger).  Since any effect of r or ∆aij has on job design is through its effect on ∆, here 
we focus on the effect of ∆ on job design, i.e., we want to know the sign of ∂b/∂∆.   
Proposition 5: Worse coordination technology leads to larger job span, i.e., ∂b/∂∆ > 0. 
Proof: Recall the fact that ∆ is only in Q in the form of Q = ∆(1-b)/b
2.  In b
*, take 
derivative of b with respect to ∆ to obtain   
2ψQQQb
2(ω + wθ + cbθ)(∂b/∂∆) + 2ψQQQ∆Qb(ω + wθ + cbθ)  
 +  2ψQQbb(ω + wθ + cbθ)(∂b/∂∆) + 2ψQQb∆(ω + wθ + cbθ) + 2ψQQbcθ(∂b/∂∆) 
 -  cθψQQ∆ - cθψQQb(∂b/∂∆) 
 =  0 
Rearrange this expression to obtain A(∂b/∂∆) = B, where 
  A = 2ψQQQb
2(ω + wθ + cbθ) + 2ψQQbb(ω + wθ + cbθ) + ψQQbcθ , and  
B = cθψQQ∆ - 2ψQQQ∆Qb(ω + wθ + cbθ) - 2ψQQb∆(ω + wθ + cbθ).  
We know A < 0, as shown in the proof of Proposition 1.  It is easy to verify that Q∆ > 0 
and Qb∆< 0.  So B < 0, and ∂b/∂∆ > 0.      Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5 confirms our intuition that, when it is more difficult to coordinate 
between workers’ actions, jobs should be less specialized to relieve the burden of 
coordination.  Recall the fact that a larger ∆ can be the result of either a smaller r, or a 
larger ∆aij, or both.  So, what Proposition 5 tells us is that, when communication becomes 
more difficult and less reliable (a smaller r), job span should increase.  Similarly, if a 
misunderstanding and uncoordinated actions have a more severe consequence, job span 
should increase to improve coordination.  The result confirms what Bolton and 
Dewatripont (1994) and Garicano (2000) have found before.  But it is different than 
Dessein and Santos (2003) who modeled the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post 
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communication technology.   
Next we study how a change in θ, which is a measure of labor productivity, 
affects job design.  Recall the fact that the production of the final product has an inverse 
functional form of L = θq
2, with θ = 1/θ’ =1/aK
α.  This means that a larger θ represents 
lower productivity of the intermediate product qall lines and the labor used to produce it.   
Proposition 6 : When labor productivity is lower, job span is larger, i.e., ∂b/∂θ > 0, if the 
output effect of productivity dominates.  The opposite is true, i.e., ∂b/∂θ < 0, if the total 
training cost effect of productivity dominates. 
Proof : In b
*, take derivative of b
* with respect to θ to obtain A(∂b/∂θ) = B, where 
  A = 2ψQQQb
2(ω + wθ + cbθ) + 2ψQQbb(ω + wθ + cbθ) + ψQQbcθ, and  
  B = - 2ψQQb(w + cb) + cψ 
A<0 is shown in the proof of Proposition 1.  In B, the first term measure the effect of a 
change in θ on output.  When this effect dominates, B < 0, leading to ∂b/∂θ > 0.  The 
second term in B is positive.  It measures how training cost increases when productivity 
declines.  When this effect dominates, ∂b/∂θ < 0.        Q.E.D.  
  So, workers are given broader jobs if output level is significantly lower because 
labor is less productive.  However, if output level remains high (is not reduced by much) 
when labor is less productive, many more workers need to be hired.  The marginal effect 
of a saving on unit training cost on total training cost becomes much more significant.  
This leads to reduced job span.   
 
7. Discussions of the model 
 24Marginal productivity and the effects of demand and supply on job design 
We have explained in section 2 why it is necessary and reasonable to assume 
constant marginal productivity of labor on each production line.  We argued that 
equilibrium job span can never be in the range where marginal productivity of labor is 
rapidly increasing or decreasing.  When it is, the problem of job design would be trivial: 
the firm would simply add more workers to the line if the gain from assigning more 
workers to the line is large, or reduce the number of workers if the opposite is true.   
When qall lines is used as an intermediate input to produce the final output, we 
assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function in which qall lines has declining marginal 
productivity.  This assumption is conventional.  It is also critical in the model and for 
many of its results.  If the marginal productivity of qall lines (and L used to produce it) is 
constant, output level, and all the demand and supply factors affecting it, would have no 
effect on job span.  We would then be in the special case where the division of labor is 
determined mainly by the need of coordination as in Becker and Murphy (1992).   
To see the critical importance of declining marginal return of qall lines to the model, 
suppose that the production function is q = aK
α(qall lines)
β with β = 1 so that the marginal 
productivity of qall lines is constant.  Then, since labor used in the production of qall lines also 
has constant marginal return, final output q would have a linear relationship with labor.  
Equation 2 becomes L = θq.  The firm’s objective function Equation 5 becomes  
[Eψ(Q, I)]q – ωq
2 – wθq – cbθq.    
The first-order condition for optimum requires finding b = b* at which  
ψQQbq – cbθq = 0,  
which after canceling terms is  
 25ψQQb – cbθ = 0.   
Job span is then purely determined by the tradeoff between product quality and the cost 
of training.  We thus have 
Proposition 7 : Output level does not affect job span if the marginal productivity of labor 
is constant. 
Proof :  See the preceding discussion.          Q.E.D. 
Intuitively, Proposition 7 is due to the fact that, when marginal productivity of 
labor is constant, the marginal benefit of increased job span and the marginal cost of it 
are weighted equally by q.  As the weights of q on benefit and cost of increased job span 
are exactly the same and cancels out with each other, q becomes neutral in determining 
job design.  With output level irrelevant, factors such as consumer income, slop of 
demand and worker’s wage, which all affect job span only indirectly through output level, 
would no longer have any effect on job design.  Unit training cost and labor productivity 
still affect job design, but the ambiguity of their effects are removed because the indirect 
effects on job span through changes in output level are no longer there.   
  Since the effect of output on job span is neutral only when it has exactly equal 
weight on both the marginal benefit and the marginal cost, the neutrality goes away when 
the productivity of qall lines is not constant.  For this reason, we know the assumption of 
β=0.5 is not critical.  So long as 0 < β < 1, all the results of our model are qualitatively 
unchanged.  When β > 1, meaning that labor has an increasing return, output has a larger 
weight on the marginal benefit of job design than on marginal cost.  The results of our 
model would then be reversed.  A larger market and lower wage would have led to an 
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marginal total benefit of increased job span more significant.   
  In their model, Becker and Murphy (1992) assumed that every worker is equally 
productive, which implies constant marginal productivity of labor.  They then focused on 
the optimization problem of the individual worker, with individual worker’s productivity 
and the problem of coordination as the main tradeoff involved in the firm’s specialization 
decision.  As clear from Proposition 7, this assumption is critical for their conclusion that 
the size of the market generally has no effect on specialization.   
It is worthwhile and important to point out that, to say that output affects job span 
negatively or positively does not mean that job span will necessarily decrease or increase 
with output.  As clear from Propositions 2, 4 and 6, sometimes, a countervailing force 
may exist and completely offset the effect of a larger output on job span.   
Integer problem.  
  Since the number of workers n is an integer and that the production line is of unit 
length, we face the problem that, after the optimal job span b
* is determined, it is likely 
that 1/b
* ≠ n, or, equivalently, nb
* ≠ 1.  This problem does not fundamentally affect our 
analyses.  It can be dealt with in different ways.  
  Let n be the number of the workers assigned to a line such that (n-1)b
* <
 1, but 
nb
*>1.  We can let b
* be the job span of (n-1) workers so that they can cover (n-1)b
* of 
the line.  The nth worker can then be assigned to the last job to fully cover the production 
line.  The job span of this worker is bn = [1 – (n-1)b
*] < b
*.  
  We can arbitrarily assume that the last worker, who serves as a residual taker, 
cannot affect product quality so that all our analyses could proceed as before.  If the 
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change in job span b may or may not affect product quality measure Q, for Q can be 
improved only when the change in job span b is sufficiently large so that one worker is 
cut from the line.  Let b0 < b1.  A change in job span from b0 to b1 leads to better product 
quality only if (n-1)b0 < 1 (so that under b0 the nth worker is needed to take up the 
residual job) and (n-1)b1 > 1 (so that under b1 the nth worker is not needed).  As the 
effect of job span on Q becomes discrete, so does the tradeoff between quality and the 
cost of training.   
  Discrete changes in Q should not fundamentally affect the analyses and the results 
of our model.  In the model, the effects of market size, worker’s wage, the slope of 
demand and coordination technology on job span are all monotonic.  So, instead of 
continuous adjustment of job span (in the absence of any adjustment cost), the firm will 
wait until a parameter, e.g., market size, has sufficiently changed to warrant a significant 
change in job span that will lead to a change in the number of workers needed to fully 
cover the line.  The direction of such a discrete change in job span would be the same as 
in the case of continuous changes that we have analyzed. 
The same is true when unit training cost c is sufficiently small relative to the size 
of the market.  When c is large and changes to cross a turning point, the direction of its 
effect on job span may be difficult to predict.  The significance of this problem, however, 
is likely to be limited for two reasons.  First, the number of such turning points is limited.  
Second and more importantly, since in most realistic situations, unit training cost c is 
very small relative to the size of the market, we can restrict our attention to the range of 
the values of c in which ∂b/∂c < 0.  Within the range, discrete change in job span would 
 28have the same direction predicted by the analysis of continuous change in b.  Labor 
productivity measure θ is another parameter with an ambiguous effect on job span so that 
a change of it crossing the turning point may make it difficult to predict the direction of 
the change in job span.  Again, we can notice the limited number of such turning points 
and can use the result of Proposition 6 to predict discrete changes in job span within a 
range of productivity measure θ.  
Other benefits of increased job span 
  Empirical studies of human resource practices have consistently found that job 
design affects performance in multiple dimensions, such as delivery time and product 
varieties, besides product quality.  Our model can be reinterpreted to accommodate other 
performance measures.   
We can see delivery time as a quality issue, and reinterpret Q as a measure of 
delay time in delivering the product.  Informing everybody else if a bottleneck is being 
formed and what kind of help is needed to resolve the problem, and when to expect the 
work to be done, are often important contents of communication and coordination among 
the workers working together. It is also a typical case of person-to-person communication.  
Failure to effectively transmit this kind of information and take proper actions causes a 
delay in product delivery and is costly to the firm like other quality problems.  In the 
words of our model, (1-r) can be the probability that two workers misunderstand each 
other.  ∆aij can be the extra time lost between two workers when they experience a 
coordination failure.  Q can be the aggregate time loss.  Empirically, the studies of Baily 
(1993), Berg et al (1994) and Dunlop and Weil (1996) all provided convincing evidence 
that mitigating such time losses is why in the apparel industry group-based job design (in 
 29which each worker performs a much larger span of tasks) is more likely to be adopted 
when the pressure on delivery time is high.
12   
A very important feature of modern manufacturing is variety proliferation of 
many products.  Firms strive for a strategy of increased varieties typically design jobs 
more broadly for their workers.
13  Although it does not directly address this phenomenon, 
our model sheds light on the relationship of product variety to job design.  We can see 
increased product varieties as a firm moving away from serving one large market of mass 
consumption to serving more smaller markets.  Our model has a clear prediction that this 
should lead to a larger job span.  We can also see increased varieties as a quality issue, 
with customer satisfaction improved when the variety for what a customer exactly wants 
is more readily available.  When customers demonstrate greater willingness to pay a 
premium for the varieties of their individual choices, we can say their quality sensitivity 
has increased.  Our model again predicts increased job span as a response.   
In another angle, it is very reasonable to see consumer sensitivity to variety as a 
normal good, similar to what we have assumed about consumer sensitivity to product 
quality.
14  Thus we can expect the demand for product variety to become stronger as 
consumer income increases.  This has the implication that, when product variety is 
considered, it may no longer true that higher income leads to a larger market (more 
demand for the product at given prices).  In fact, the opposite may be true.  As higher 
income leads to increased customer willingness to pay for the variety of one’s individual 
                                                           
12 Berg et al (1994) specifically noted that, under the progressive bundle system featured by 
narrowly defined jobs, bundles moving from one operator to another are often not picked up on 
time, but rather waiting at each station.  
13 See Aoki (1990) for an account of the relationship between product variety and job design in 
the Japanese automobile industry, and Ichniowski et al (1997) for an account of this relationship 
in the US steel industry. 
 30choice, it serves as a market divisor: At higher consumer incomes, the firm finds itself 
serving not one larger, but many smaller markets.  In such a case, consumer income 
would no longer have opposing effects on job span as found in Proposition 2.  Rather, it 
would unambiguously lead to increased job span.
15
 
8. The relationship with the literature  
This paper is most closely related to the literature studying coordination problems 
in organizations, especially that in the tradition of Becker and Murphy (1992), Bolton and 
Dewartripont (1994) and Dessein and Santos (2003) on horizontal division of labor.  In 
the Introduction, we summarized Becker and Murphy (1992).  The main tradeoff in 
Bolton and Dewartripont (1994) is that workers become more efficient when they handle 
only specialized information, which provides the reason for assigning more workers to 
parallel processing of a cohort of information.  In our model, assigning more workers to a 
production line has a comparable effect on efficiency reflected in savings on training cost.  
In their model, the benefit of specialization is (partly or entirely) offset by increased costs 
of communication when more workers work together and form a communication network.  
In our model, the benefit is also offset by potential communication problems leading to 
lower expected product quality.  Dessein and Santos (2003) modeled the tradeoff 
between ex ante coordination by rules and ex post coordination by communication, and 
endogenously derived the demand for coordination.  As already pointed out, the part of 
our model on coordination is directly from theirs.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 Hodaka Morita and Michael Waldman called my attention to this point.   
15 Whether higher consumer income will lead to a larger market or greater demand for varieties is 
an empirical question.  Historically, both types of experiences seem to exist.     
 31Other important contributions to the literature of coordination include Marschak 
and Radner (1972), Arrow (1974), Radner (1992, 1993), Van Zandt (1990, 1999), Radner 
and Van Zandt (1992), and Vayanos (2003), who studied information processing and 
decentralization.  Hierarchy is often the subject of these studies, whereas this paper 
considers only horizontal division of labor.  Ichniowski and Shaw (2004) studied how 
connective capital possessed by workers affects knowledge sharing and problem solving.   
A large literature has studied various incentive problems and their implications 
for organizational design and human resource practices.
16  Our model abstracts away 
from all incentive issues.  It would be very interesting to see what further insights can be 
gained in a more integrated, but still manageable, model that incorporates the firm’s 
external demand and supply conditions, internal coordination and incentive problems.   
Human capital theory is a cornerstone of modern labor economics.  It also has 
many important implications for organizations.  Theories of human capital investment 
can be intertwined with either incentive or pure coordination problems.
 17  Among many 
others, Kahn and Huberman (1988), Chang and Wang (1996) and Bai and Wang (2003) 
studied moral hazard problems in human capital investment and their implications for 
organizational design.  Waldman (1990) studied the signaling effect of human capital 
investment.  Chang and Wang (1995) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) used models 
with both moral hazard and selection problems in human capital investment to derive 
multiple equilibria in human resource practices.  Bernhardt and Scoones (1998) studied 
                                                           
16 Ben-Ner at al (1993) have a discussion of coordination and incentives as the two fundamental 
problems in organizations. Maskin, Qian and Xu’s (2000) work on multidivisional versus unitary 
hierarchies in providing information on managerial performance is a good example of incentive 
problems with organizational implications.  A survey of the incentive literature would be a very 
challenging task.  Predergast (1999) provides one that is concise and accessible.  
 32how labor market competition under asymmetric information and internal promotion 
affect worker’s specific capital investment decision.  Ichniowski and Shaw (2004) is an 
example of human capital investment to address coordination problems.  Our model has 
per worker and total amount of training as a function of job design.  So its results on job 
design contribute to the human capital theory.   
International differences in the organization of production and human resource 
practices have interested many scholars.  Studies along this line not only are applications 
of, but also contribute greatly to, organizational theories.  Drastically different US and 
Japanese human resource practices captured much interest in these studies.  Aoki (1988) 
provides an authoritative survey of this literature.  Recent contributions to this literature 
include Carmichael and MacLeod (1993), Chang and Wang (1995), Blinder and Kruger 
(1996), Kato (2001), Morita (2001, 2003, 2004).  The comparative statics analyses of our 
model have implications for comparative studies of organizations.   
Morita (2004) has noticed that, in most theoretic studies of organizations and 
human resource practices, firm’s strategic behavior and employment practices have been 
treated separately under industrial-organization and labor-centered models.  Recently, a 
new trend has emerged to more explicitly study the relationship of the external market 
with the internal organization and human resource practices.  Prominent in this minority 
group is the pioneering work of Hermalin (1994) on how Cournot competition affects 
incentives for managers.  Also in the literature are Wang (2002) on the effect of spatial 
competition on firms’ multiskilling decision, and Morita (2004) on the effect of firm’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 Human Implications of human capital investment for organizations including comparative 
organizations have been extensively studied.  See Gibbons and Waldman (1999) for a survey.  
 33survival rate on labor mobility and specific human capital investment.
18  This paper is 
another effort in this direction that takes a more integrated approach to the study of the 
interdependence and interactions between market and internal organization.   
 
9. Summary and concluding remarks 
Our model is built on the following few plausible and conventional core assumptions. 
•  There is a gain to specialization.  
•  Coordination is more difficult when jobs are more specialized, leading to lower 
product quality.  
•  The demand for the product is lower when the price of the product is higher, the 
income of the consumer is lower, or the quality of the product is poorer.  
•  The marginal productivity of labor is decreasing.   
An integrated treatment of these factors fills a gap between empirical literature and 
theories studying job design.  It allows the model to shed much new light on previous 
theories of what determines the division of labor.  The model confirms some results 
obtained by other authors, such as how coordination technology affects job design.  It 
clarifies some issues, such as the effect of market size on the division of labor.  It has also 
obtained new results on how consumer sensitivity to product quality, labor cost, and labor 
productivity affect job design.   
The model has the capacity to be extended.  The desirable directions of extension 
discussed below also reflect the limitations of the present model.  First, it would be 
interesting and important to model a market in which there is more than just one firm.  
                                                           
18 Also worth mentioning is Milgrom and Roberts (1990), whose incorporate a downward sloping 
demand curve into the model on manufacturing strategy.    
 34Such a model can be used to study how strategic interaction among the firms affects job 
design.  For example, if, besides price, quantity and capacity, the firms also compete in 
product quality for market shares, how is the tradeoff between the cost and benefit of 
specialization is affected?  How do the firms in the same market differentiate themselves 
in their competitive (e.g., quality) strategy, job design and other dimensions of internal 
organization?  These are questions of great theoretic and empirical importance.   
Second, in reality, job design must typically consider both coordination and incentive 
problems.  However, so far, we have to yet build a model that includes both fundamental 
problems in organizations.  Technically, modeling either one of these two fundamental 
organizational problems is complicated enough.  An integrated treatment of them both 
would make the model difficult to track.  The model we used in this paper is meaningful 
and yet not too hard to track.  Hopefully, it represents a step forward towards a model of 
job design that contains both coordination and incentive problems.  
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